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REFORMING POWER OF ATTORNEY
LAW TO PROTECT ALASKAN
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EXPLOITATION
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ABSTRACT
In this Article, the Author discusses the issues arising under the current
power of attorney law in Alaska and the impact the law has on Alaskan
elders. The Author surveys and summarizes preventative measures set out in
the 2006 Uniform Power of Attorney Act (UPOAA), in addition to nonUPOAA reforms adopted in other jurisdictions or suggested by scholars. The
Author analyzes the relevance and practicality of the various provisions as
applied to Alaska and highlights the major themes that should be considered
when reforming the current statute.
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INTRODUCTION
“I know it when I see it.”1 This famous legal saying applies aptly to
the offense of elder exploitation. Because of the vulnerabilities
associated with aging, elders are prone to many levels of financial
exploitation unique to their demographic. And because this exploitation
does not fit squarely into conventional legal categories, many of these
crimes go unreported and unprosecuted.2 This is particularly evident
when there is abuse of a power of attorney (POA).
Consider the following hypotheticals, A and B. In A, the elderly
Jane is physically frail and requires assistance going to the bathroom at
all hours of the daytime. Jennifer and her daughter, Jane, decide that
Jennifer will move in to provide care when Jennifer is home and hire a
personal care assistant to be there while Jennifer is at work. The two also
agree that Jennifer will pay Jane’s mortgage, utilities, health expenses,
and sundries with money from Jane’s life savings. To grant Jennifer
access to Jane’s funds, Jane appoints Jennifer her attorney-in-fact using a

1. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to Guardianship: Lessons
We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 7, 13 (2007).
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durable POA document,3 but the two never sign a written contractual
agreement that the funds will be used exclusively for paying Jane’s
living and health expenses. At the time Jane signs the POA form, she is
mentally competent but increasingly forgetful, and she eventually loses
competence as a result of Alzheimer’s Disease. Shortly after Jennifer
moves in with Jane, she uses Jane’s funds to pay for the mortgage,
utilities, and other necessary health supplies, as agreed. However, after
Jane loses competence, Jennifer changes the beneficiaries on all of Jane’s
insurance and benefit policies, naming Jennifer’s children as
beneficiaries, replacing Jane’s elderly sisters. Nothing in the statutory
durable POA prohibits Jennifer from taking this action.4
In hypothetical B, the same facts apply as in hypothetical A, except
that after a year, Jennifer stops using Jane’s funds to pay Jane’s
mortgage and health expenses. Instead, Jennifer uses the funds for her
own exclusive benefit, causing Jane to go six months in arrears on her
mortgage. Jane finds out about this and revokes the POA with Jennifer’s
knowledge. On the same day Jane does this, Jennifer goes to Jane’s bank
and uses the now-revoked POA to transfer the remainder of Jane’s funds
to Jennifer’s personal bank account. The bank teller is suspicious and
considers reporting the transaction to the authorities but is hesitant for
fear of violating privacy laws. He decides to review the notarized POA
document presented to him by Jennifer, which he recognizes as a
statutory form. The teller comes across the following text:
A third party who fails to honor a properly executed statutory
form power of attorney may be liable to the principal, the
attorney-in-fact, the principal’s heirs, assigns, or estate for a
civil penalty, plus damages, costs, and fees associated with the
failure to comply with the statutory form power of attorney.5
After reading these words, the bank teller completes the transaction.
These two hypotheticals highlight problems inherent in the current
law, or lack of law, governing power of attorney in Alaska. In
hypothetical A, Jennifer acted entirely within the law. Although Jane did
not contemplate Jennifer’s actions when she signed the durable POA
document, nothing in the document itself prohibited Jennifer from
reassigning Jane’s assets.6 Case law in Alaska on the issue is scarce; at
most, a court might find that Jennifer’s duty as an agent is to act in
3. “Durable” denotes survival of the POA after the principal loses mental
capacity. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 26 (2009). Thus, Jennifer’s POA will continue
even if Jane becomes incapacitated.
4. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (2008).
5. Id.
6. See id.
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Jane’s “best interests” once Jane has become incompetent.7 Although
Jane made a clear decision to make her sisters the beneficiaries on her
life insurance policy, Jennifer could claim that it actually was in Jane’s
best interests for Jennifer’s children to become beneficiaries of the life
insurance policies. Jennifer could argue that she would have left Jane
entirely in the care of paid strangers without the incentive of funds for
her children, that Jane was aware of this fact, and therefore that it was in
Jane’s best interests to have the beneficiaries changed.
In hypothetical B, Jennifer has clearly acted contrary to law by
using an invalid POA. However, since Alaska does not require that the
POA be recorded,8 the bank teller had no way of determining that the
validly issued POA was subsequently revoked. Additionally, despite his
suspicions, the current state of the law creates a disincentive for the
teller to prevent the transaction because of the foreboding statutory
warning that penalties could be assessed against him and his workplace.
These two situations highlight the problems with the current power
of attorney law in Alaska. Elder exploitation has recently gained
attention in the media9 and is increasingly recognized as a real and
widespread problem.10 As the prevalence of POAs in estate planning
increases, so too will accompanying fraudulent behavior. This in turn
will require increased formality in the procedures required when
creating a POA.11 Further, elder exploitation will only increase as the
“baby boomer” generation ages.12
The problem with attempting to create legal recourse for elder
fraud and exploitation is that both involve subtle types of theft.13 The
victimized elder often transfers property to an account shared with the

7. Courts in Alaska have yet to discuss precisely the fiduciary duty of a
POA. However, courts would likely analogize a POA’s duty to that of an
attorney at law and incorporate the analysis laid out in Miller v. Sears, 636 P.2d
1183 (Alaska 1981).
8. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (2008).
9. Recent scandals involving the Astor dynasty of New York City have
brought elder abuse to the forefront of the media’s attention. See John Eligon,
Brooke Astor’s Son Guilty in Scheme to Defraud Her, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/09/nyregion/09astor.html.
10. See Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly: Is the Solution a
Problem?, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 267, 268 (2003). In Philadelphia, the district
attorney conducted a “crackdown” on durable POA abuse. Jonathan Federman
& Meg Reed, Abuse and the Durable Power of Attorney: Options for Reform, GOV’T
LAW ONLINE, Mar. 1994, at 1, 26–27, available at http://www.governmentlaw.
org/files/1993_Sandman.pdf.
11. See Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of
Fiduciary Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2001).
12. See Federman & Reed, supra note 10, at 43.
13. See Dessin, supra note 10, at 269.
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perpetrator, who may use the account for her own purposes.14 The POA
is one of the tools used by those who prey on the elderly,15 as the
document enables a perpetrator to commit crimes under what appears
to be the elder’s consent. Alaska’s small population often exacerbates the
problems of unchecked and abused POAs.
Since the Alaska POA statute is similar to those in other
jurisdictions, this Article will track the recommendations made
nationwide in order to analyze the law governing powers of attorney
and determine what can be done to protect elders from POA abuse in
Alaska. Part I of this Article summarizes the history of the development
of the durable POA and how it has evolved into its present-day form.
Part II analyzes the key attributes of Alaska POA law and the problems
that result from gaps in the law. Part III summarizes the remedies
proposed nationwide to curb POA abuse, and Part IV analyzes and
recommends potential remedies relevant to Alaska.

I. LEGAL ORIGINS OF THE POWER OF ATTORNEY DOCUMENT AS
AN ESTATE PLANNING TOOL
A.

Background

1. Definition
Through a POA, a person uses a legal document to permit someone
else to act on his behalf “temporarily for purposes of convenience or, as
often recommended by elder law and estate planning attorneys, for
purposes of planning for incapacity.”16 A POA is considered “durable”
if the “authority remains even if the principal becomes incompetent.”17
In a few states, a POA is presumed to be durable unless otherwise
noted.18 In most states, however, a POA is not durable unless the
document specifically states that it is.19 This Article will use the term
14. See id. Other examples include “unauthorized use of victim’s credit cards
and bank cards, creation of joint account interests, execution of deeds under
duress, [and] diversion of Social Security and pension payments . . . .” Whitton,
supra note 2, at 14.
15. See Whitton, supra note 2, at 12.
16. LORI A. STIEGEL & ELLEN M. KLEM, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., POWER OF
ATTORNEY ABUSE: WHAT STATES CAN DO ABOUT IT 9 (2008), available at
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/2008_17_poa.pdf; see also Boxx, supra
note 11, at 7.
17. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 26 (2009).
18. Federman & Reed, supra note 10, at 9.
19. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 26 (2009). In general, most jurisdictions require
that specific language be present. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 72.5.501(1) (2009)
(“A durable power of attorney . . . contains the words, ‘This power of attorney is
not affected by subsequent disability or incapacity of the principal or lapse of
time’ or ‘This power of attorney becomes effective upon the disability or
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“power of attorney” to refer to a “durable power of attorney” unless
otherwise stated.
Subject to less court scrutiny than required in a guardianship, and
less costly and less complicated than the formation of a trust, a durable
POA is often used to serve as a flexible and convenient mechanism for
estate management.20 In Alaska, recordation is permitted but not
required,21 and there is no central registry where POAs must be filed.
The only verification requirement is that the signatures on the POA
document be notarized—but the notary public has no duty apart from
determining the identities of the persons signing the document.22 A
statutory form is provided, and any non-statutory forms must comply
substantially with, and not contradict, the provisions in the statutory
form.23
When used properly, a POA can be an effective estate management
tool because of its ease of use and formation. Its greatest benefit,
however, is also its greatest flaw: an agent’s unchecked authority makes
a POA an effective means of defrauding elders.24
2. History
The POA derived from the common law principle of agency, and in
its early form it ceased to be effective upon the incompetency of the
principal.25 The Model Special Power of Attorney for Small Property
Interests Act of 1964 defined the POA as a means of providing a less
expensive alternative to guardianship for small estates.26 The principal’s
signature before a judge was required, as were an inventory of the
property in the estate and a statement of the principal’s annual income.27
The POA document had to be filed and recorded, accounting was
required, and estates exceeding a certain amount could not use the POA
document.28 This formulation presumed that the risks inherent in a POA

incapacity of the principal’ or similar words showing the intent of the principal
that the authority conferred must be exercisable notwithstanding the principal’s
subsequent disability or incapacity.”).
20. See Whitton, supra note 2, at 16. (“[D]urable powers [of attorney] were
meant to be a low-cost, flexible, and private alternative to guardianship.”).
21. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.332, 34.25.010 (2008).
22. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (2008). The sample General Power of
Attorney form provided in Section 13.26.332 of the Alaska Statutes requires the
signature of an officer or notary. Id.
23. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.347 (2008).
24. See Boxx, supra note 11, at 12.
25. See id. at 4–5; see also Federman & Reed, supra note 10, at 4.
26. See STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at 9; see also Boxx, supra note 11, at 7.
27. Boxx, supra note 11, at 8.
28. Id.
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were minimized if the assets at stake were small.29 It also presumed that
family members were more trustworthy agents than those with no
acquaintance to a principal.30 The 1964 Act upheld the long-held agency
rule that an agency relationship no longer exists if a principal who
appointed an agent becomes incompetent or dies; thus, a POA ceased to
be effective upon the incompetency or death of its principal.31
It was not until 1969 that the principle of durability replaced the
common law rule.32 The Uniform Probate Code in 1969 created a
provision allowing for a durable POA.33 Virginia was the first state to
permit this instrument, and the durable POA became a popular estate
planning tool.34 The 1969 Act also removed the provision limiting the
POA to small estates.35 The 1984 and 1987 versions of the Uniform
Durable Power of Attorney Act removed provisions relating to agent
liability,36 and by 1984, all states had durable POA statutes.37 From the
1960s through the 1990s, statutory revisions were less concerned with
guarding against abuse and more focused on developing the POA into a
streamlined estate planning mechanism.38
These early forms of the POA did not provide explicit options for
third parties who wished to prevent or call attention to POA abuse by
agents, and states only began to implement reforms in this area in the
early 1990s.39 The early forms also failed to contemplate the predicament
of third party financial institutions presented with fraudulent POAs,
resulting in litigation against both those institutions that honored a
fraudulent POA and those that refused a valid POA.40

29. Id. at 7–9. Smaller estates, however, generally have fewer financial
resources available for use in recovering defrauded assets. Furthermore, the loss
of a small sum has a far more significant effect on a small estate than on a large
one.
30. Id. at 8. Research data has, however, proven the opposite to be true. THE
NAT’L CTR. ON ELDER ABUSE, ABUSE OF ADULTS AGE 60+: THE 2004 SURVEY OF
ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES 19 (2006), available at http://www.apsnetwork.
org/Resources/docs/AbuseAdults60.pdf.
31. See, e.g., Boxx, supra note 11, at 7–8.
32. Federman & Reed, supra note 10, at 13.
33. Boxx, supra note 11, at 10.
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id. at 10; see also STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at 9.
36. STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at 9.
37. Federman & Reed, supra note 10, at 4.
38. See id. at 1.
39. Id. at 66 (referencing changes made in California, Missouri, New
Hampshire, and Illinois).
40. See generally Daniel A. Wentworth, Durable Powers of Attorney: Considering
the Financial Institution’s Perspective, 17 PROB. & PROP. 37 (2003).
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2006 Uniform Power of Attorney Act and Other Reforms

By 2006, it was clear that the POA had become a tool for financial
exploitation. The 2006 Uniform Power of Attorney Act (UPOAA or the
“Act”) was the first uniform act to propose provisions designed to
prevent abuse.41 By March 2008, New Mexico and Idaho had enacted the
UPOAA, with more states expected to follow suit in 2009.42 The Act
includes a clearer explanation of what constitutes “good faith” for an
agent43 and reserves special treatment for “hot powers”—those powers
which have the capacity to diminish the value of the principal’s estate
and assets.44 The Act also contains provisions that specifically address
both the liability of and possible sanctions against third parties and
agents.45 The intention of the Act was to address the shortcomings of its
predecessors in these areas.

II. KEY PROVISIONS OF AND PROBLEMS WITH POWER OF
ATTORNEY LAW IN ALASKA
A.

Provisions of the Alaska Power of Attorney Statute

The POA statute in Alaska reflects the longstanding national trend
of developing the POA as an efficient estate planning tool. In Alaska,
POAs may be recorded, though, as previously noted, recordation is not
required.46 Alaska provides a recommended form and requires all
lawful POAs to be consistent with the form.47 Unless a principal dictates
otherwise (by crossing out and initialing), the statutory form enables an
agent to enter real estate, banking, and estate transactions, and to
disseminate the principal’s funds in any manner.48 It allows for
durability where there is clear and unambiguous language indicating
such.49 The statutory form also allows a principal to limit an agent’s
power so that it arises only when the principal becomes incompetent.50

41. STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at vii.
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id. at vii.
44. See id.; see also Linda S. Whitton, The Uniform Power of Attorney Act:
Striking a Balance Between Autonomy and Protection, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 343, 347
(2008).
45. See STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at viii. The specific provisions of the
Act, along with recommended reforms, will be discussed infra Part III.
46. ALASKA STAT. § 34.25.010 (2008).
47. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (2008).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Alternate POAs are permitted.51 The statutory form lays out the
procedure and requirements for revocation and protects third parties
who reasonably rely on a statutory POA.52 No legal counsel is required
when elders use the statutory or any other POA form.53
The statute also lays out requirements for establishing the
incompetence or disability of a principal,54 but at no point is this
procedure required by statute in order to effectively utilize a POA after a
principal has become incompetent.55 Nor is an assessment of a
principal’s competence required at the signing of a POA.56 The statutory
form specifically protects third parties who accept the POA based on
“reasonable representations” and imposes a $1000 fine on a third party
who refuses to do so.57 This provision, however, has been interpreted to
mean that a POA must be valid in order to require the third party to
accept it.58
There is no statutory provision requiring that a copy of a POA be
retained by a third party to whom it is presented.59 Nor is there a
statutory provision prohibiting the use of photocopies.60 As stated
earlier, recording is permitted but not required, and there is no central
registry for recording who is acting as an attorney-in-fact.61 Further,
there is no requirement for a POA to include details regarding court
procedure, inventory, or accounting relating to a principal’s assets.62
B.

Modern Problems with the Alaska Statute

There is no dispositive survey on the prevalence of POA abuse
nationwide or in Alaska.63 While there have been some surveys of estate
attorneys, these studies are by no means exhaustive.64 Recent studies,
51. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.335 (2008).
52. Id.
53. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (2008). The lack of legal counseling when
using a statutory form has been roundly criticized. See Federman & Reed, supra
note 10, at 20; see also infra Part III.
54. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.353(a)(1)–(2) (2008).
55. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.332, 13.26.350(a) (2008).
56. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (2008). It seems this requirement becomes
relevant only if the POA has not been designated as “durable” and someone has
challenged the use of a non-durable POA on behalf of an incompetent principal.
See ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.350 (2008).
57. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.353(b)–(c) (2008).
58. See Whitton, supra note 2, at 42.
59. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.332–.358 (2008).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Whitton, supra note 2, at 12.
64. Id.
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however, indicate that financial exploitation of elders is widespread and
increasing, and that even if the incidence of exploitation is low, the
consequences in each particular case can be devastating.65
The insufficiency of the Alaska statute is illustrated by the
hypothetical situations presented above.66 In hypothetical A, the agent’s
transactions may have exceeded the scope of the authority delegated by
the once-competent principal and may overtly contravene the
principal’s prior intentions. Further, even if the agent in hypothetical A
acted in good faith, there is no specific guidance in the POA document
as to the scope of the agent’s authority, making it difficult to discern
when agents are acting in good faith.67 The transaction also suggests
self-dealing.68 However, the durability component of the document
enables the perpetrator to act in a self-dealing manner, and a court could
find that the perpetrator acted entirely within her authority under the
POA.69 By using a pre-printed statutory form that gives little
information to the principal and the agent as to the extent of the
authority and how that authority should be used, the agent is anointed
with broad decision-making authority.70 Additionally, the fact that the
principal had become incompetent by the time the fraud was
perpetrated demonstrates that the principal lost her ability to monitor
the agent, a power important to any agency relationship.71
Hypothetical B highlights the problems resulting when a third
party senses that something is amiss regarding a POA. While the statute
allows a third party to refuse to accept a POA that he believes is invalid,
this attempt at protecting a third party acting in good faith is obscured
by the statutory threat of a fine should that person be incorrect in
deeming a POA invalid. Compounded by the fact that there is no way in
which the third party can determine whether the POA is current, or
even valid,72 there is little incentive and substantial discouragement in
the statute for a third party to prevent a fraudulent transaction from
occurring.73 Additionally, since there is no requirement that the third
65. See id. at 12–13.
66. See supra Introduction.
67. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (2008). The importance of setting a standard
for agent conduct is discussed further in STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at 5–6.
68. See STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at 4.
69. For further treatment of this concept, see Whitton, supra note 2, at 37.
70. The dangers of using pre-printed forms have resulted in some
jurisdictions prohibiting the use of such forms altogether. See Dessin, supra note
10, at 315.
71. For further discussion of the lack of monitoring by an incompetent
principal, see id. at 10–11.
72. For further discussion of this concept, see Federman & Reed, supra note
10, at 59–62.
73. See STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at 5–6.
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party retain a copy of the POA,74 the principal will encounter proof
problems if she seeks to recover from the fraudulent agent.
In both hypotheticals, the principal grants the agent broad decisionmaking authority75 without the assistance of legal counsel and without
monitoring by the courts.76 The principal has not considered that the
selected agent could defraud her.77 Because the principal in both
scenarios is in the exclusive care of the agent, detection of a fraud will
likely come long after the principal’s estate has been exhausted. This
underscores the importance of increasing opportunities for monitoring.78
There is relief available through litigation in both hypotheticals,
even if only testimonial evidence is available. Jane, faced with the
situation in hypothetical A, may argue under the line of reasoning set
out in Ware v. Ware that Jennifer used undue influence to obtain the
POA.79 Under the hypothetical B situation, Jane might pursue a fraud
claim against the agent by using testimonial evidence provided by the
bank teller. In both scenarios, there are possible claims of breach of
fiduciary duty and fraud.80
However, the opportunity for relief through litigation does little to
prevent the occurrence of fraud. For example, elders are often precluded
from obtaining legal assistance because of a lack of resources or an
unwillingness to sue the loved ones who defrauded them.81
Additionally, criminal prosecution is rarely sought in elder fraud cases.82
Therefore, the risk of litigation and other sanctions does not appear to be
an effective deterrent in the hypothetical situations discussed above.83

74. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.332–358 (2008).
75. There are dangers inherent in appointing an agent with broad decisionmaking authority. See Federman & Reed, supra note 10, at 10.
76. See STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at 5–6.
77. For further discussion of the “disbelieving elder,” see id.
78. See Whitton, supra note 2, at 10–11; see also STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16,
at 5–6.
79. “When examining the relationship between parent and child for proof of
undue influence, we will consider ‘the effect of the influence which was, in fact,
exerted upon the mind of the [donor], considering his physical and mental
condition, the person by whom it was exerted, the time and place and all the
surrounding circumstances’. . . .” Ware v. Ware, 161 P.3d 1188, 1193 (Alaska
2007) (citations omitted).
80. See Boxx, supra note 11, at 22–23.
81. See Federman & Reed, supra note 10, at 6.
82. Id. at 42. For example, an Albany Law School Government Law Center
national survey found that only 31 out of 270 reported instances of durable POA
abuse resulted in criminal prosecution. Id.
83. See id. at 6.
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III. NATIONWIDE REFORM
Alaska is not alone in its flawed POA law; statutory reforms and
remedies have been recommended and implemented across the country.
The 2006 UPOAA was one of the first attempts by lawmakers and elder
law experts to respond to the potential for POA abuse.84 The UPOAA
has twenty-one provisions designed to address three innate problems in
the power of attorney: “(1) the breadth of control that an agent generally
has over the principal’s property, (2) the lack of third-party oversight . . .
and (3) the lack of legal standards and clarity about the duty owed by
the agent to the principal.”85
The following survey of reforms is comprised of provisions found
in the UPOAA, statutory provisions from other jurisdictions, and
recommendations by experts in elder law. The survey is divided into
four sections: (a) reforms that better educate principals, (b) reforms that
better educate and deter agents from fraud, (c) reforms that protect third
parties and require them to prevent fraud from occurring when fraud is
evident, and (d) reforms that create additional remedies for defrauded
victims. Each section will review the reforms suggested by the UPOAA
and list non-UPOAA recommendations. This survey focuses on the
provisions addressing intentional POA abuse and is not intended to be
an exhaustive survey of all possible reform provisions.
A.

Reforms That Educate the Principal

Principals often sign POA forms without fully understanding the
nature of the power bestowed by the POA.86 This fact has been
identified as one of the primary factors leading to POA abuse.87
For instance, principals in Alaska who use the statutory form
delegate power to their agents to act on their behalf in: real estate
transactions; transactions involving tangible personal property, chattels,
goods, bonds, and shares; commodities transactions; banking
transactions; business operating transactions; insurance transactions;
estate transactions; and gift transactions.88 To prohibit agents from
having a particular power, principals must cross out that power and
initial the adjacent line on the form.89 The Alaska statute does not

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at vii.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 5–6.
Id.; cf. Whitton, supra note 2, at 18–19.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (2008).
Id.
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require affirmative language for a principal to delegate the listed
powers.90
When misused, these “hot powers” enable agents to dissipate their
principals’ assets.91 Because of this potential, the UPOAA has two
provisions which treat hot powers with special importance.92
Under the UPOAA, agents are prohibited from exercising hot
powers unless the principal has expressly granted the agent such
powers in the POA document.93 This in turn requires a principal to
evaluate each of the powers he or she chooses to delegate to the agent
and by default educates the principal as to the extent of power created
by the POA document.
Because statutory short forms and pre-printed forms enable a POA
to be created without legal counseling, some experts have recommended
rejecting the statutory short form altogether.94 Others suggest that states
should require that the statutory short forms warn principals of the
authority being created,95 or that the POA be read aloud to principals
with poor eyesight.96 Experts have also suggested that principals create a
POA only as a “springing power” that arises upon the principal’s
incompetence.97 This suggestion, however, fails to account for fraud
which may occur after the principal is deemed incompetent.
The effectiveness of these warnings and educational provisions is
difficult to ascertain since the elderly principal usually does not
contemplate that her trusted agent would defraud her. For that reason,
90. Id.
91. See STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at 4–6. “Hot powers” include the
ability to:
[C]reate, amend, revoke, or terminate an inter vivos trust; make a gift;
create or change rights of survivorship; create or change a beneficiary
designation; authorize another person to exercise authority granted to
the agent; waive the principal’s right to be a beneficiary of a joint and
survivor annuity; exercise fiduciary powers that the principal has
authority to delegate; and disclaim or refuse an interest in property.
Whitton, supra note 44, at 347–48.
92. See Whitton, supra note 44, at 348; see also UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT §§
201, 301 (2006).
93. During the drafting of the UPOAA, there was a minority view that hot
powers should be made non-delegable. Whitton, supra note 44, at 348–49.
However, this arrangement may have the undesired effect of eviscerating the
utility of the POA altogether and is therefore not an optimal solution.
94. Federman & Reed, supra note 10, at 48 (citing Jeffrey Kolb, Indiana Power
of Attorney Act, 25 IND. L. REV. 1345, 1360–70 (1992)). At least one state, Indiana,
“decided against providing a statutory short form of the durable power of
attorney because of the potential abuse [of] individuals executing powers
without legal advice.”Id at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 51–55.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 23; Whitton, supra note 2, at 19.
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the provisions that complement those reforms educating the principal
are crucial to protect elders.
B.

Reforms That Educate and Deter the Agent from Committing
Fraud

The UPOAA created provisions that squarely address the
defrauding agent and impose liability on agents who violate POA law.98
Those provisions were clearly intended to impose liability as a warning
to would-be perpetrators of POA fraud and abuse.99
The UPOAA provides a back-up protective mechanism if the
principal fails to take explicit measures to delineate powers. The
UPOAA sets out three mandatory standards of care for all POAs,
regardless of whether the POA was created using statutory documents:
(1) agents must act according to the principal’s reasonable expectations,
if known, and must act otherwise in the principal’s best interest; (2)
agents must act in good faith; and (3) agents must act within the scope of
the authority granted.100 While these standards protect agents who act
contrary to the principals’ best interests when directed to do so by
competent principals,101 it also expressly mandates that an agent act in
the best interests of an incompetent principal.
The UPOAA also sets out the following default duties of agents if
there is no specification in the POA document:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

98.
99.
100.
101.

Act loyally for the principal’s benefit;
Avoid creating a conflict of interest that impairs the ability
to act impartially in the principal’s best interest;
Act with the care, competence, and diligence ordinarily
exercised by agents in similar circumstances;
Keep records;
Cooperate with a person that has authority to make
healthcare decisions for the principal;
Attempt to preserve the principal’s estate plan to the
extent the plan is known to the agent and preservation is
consistent with the principal’s best interest;
Give an accounting if requested by the principal, a
fiduciary appointed for the principal, a governmental
agency having authority to protect the principal’s welfare,

UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 117 (2006).
See STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at 12.
UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114(a)(1)–(3) (2006).
Whitton, supra note 44, at 349.
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the personal representative or successor in interest of the
principal’s estate, or if ordered by a court.102
The provisions creating these default duties were designed to
prevent self-dealing by agents who acted without specific authorization
by a principal.103 Even before the creation of the 2006 UPOAA, some
states sought to send a clear message to perpetrators of elder fraud.104 In
Arizona, the state legislature imposed criminal and civil penalties
against agents who acted “with intimidation or deception in procuring
the power of attorney or any authority provided in the POA.”105
Some experts have recommended that POAs should be registered
with the courts and require periodic accounting once a principal is
deemed incompetent.106 While the effectiveness of the monitoring
capability of an overburdened court is questionable, it has been
suggested that the mere impression of oversight would be a sufficient
deterrent to a potentially fraudulent agent.107 Also suggested is a
requirement that an agent sign an affidavit stating that he will not
commit fraud using a POA.108
Experts have recommended requiring more formal procedures
relating to the execution of a POA. Examples of these are the
requirement of the inclusion of two witnesses and the requirement that
the document be recorded.109 These experts have argued that this would
put agents on notice that they are being monitored and would enable
third parties to determine whether a purported principal is on
constructive notice that a POA exists.110
Others have suggested a requirement that an agent post a surety
bond.111 Such a requirement, however, would preclude the appointment
of agents who may be competent and trustworthy but financially
incapable of posting such a bond.
However, as more than one scholar has noted, “[e]ven a clear
prohibition in the power of attorney against making gifts cannot prevent

102. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114(b)(1)–(6), (h) (2006).
103. See Whitton, supra note 44, at 350–51.
104. See STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16, at 13.
105. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5506(a) (2005).
106. Dessin, supra note 10, at 317.
107. Id.
108. Wentworth, supra note 40, at 41–42. However, it is questionable whether
a perpetrator of fraud, who uses dishonesty as a major tool in obtaining funds,
would be deterred by such a requirement.
109. Federman & Reed, supra note 10, at 2, 48.
110. Id. at 59.
111. Id. at 80.
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an abusive agent from converting the principal’s property. . . .”112
Without reforms mandating the involvement of third parties, the
restrictions on agents are much less powerful.
C.

Reforms That Protect Third Parties and Mandate that They
Prevent Fraud

The most important factor that allows an agent to defraud a
principal is the principal’s undeserved trust in a selected agent.
Principals often give trusted family members or friends POAs without
considering that their chosen agents may be tempted to use the
authority granted under a POA for personal gain. This risk can be
mitigated to some degree by the involvement of third parties.
1. Lay Persons
The UPOAA recommends that co-agents or successor agents be
responsible for protecting principals if another agent breaches or is
about to breach a fiduciary duty.113 The Act also enumerates a number
of third parties who may petition the court to review an agent’s conduct
or a POA itself.114 Such persons include guardians, conservators,
fiduciaries, healthcare proxies, spouses, parents, descendants,
presumptive heirs, beneficiaries, governmental agencies with regulatory
authority, caregivers, or any persons asked to accept the power of
attorney.115
2. Financial Institutions
Perhaps the third parties most capable of preventing fraudulent
transactions are the financial institutions that hold a principal’s assets.
Often, bank tellers and other staff are at the front lines, conducting
transactions at an agent’s request. As in hypothetical B above, a bank
teller who suspects that a POA document is fraudulent currently has no
resources available to him to check whether his suspicions are true.
Additionally, even if a POA were recorded, a teller may worry about
violating confidentiality covenants between the principal and the bank if
he reports a perpetrator to authorities.116

112. Whitton, supra note 44, at 355 n.68 (citing Richard B. Vincent, Financial
Exploitation Involving Agents Under Powers of Attorney, VICTIMIZATION OF THE
ELDERLY & DISABLED, May–June 2000, at 3–4).
113. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 111(d) (2006); see also STIEGEL & KLEM, supra
note 16, at 12.
114. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 116(a)–(b) (2006).
115. Id.; see also Whitton, supra note 2, at 33–34.
116. See Dessin, supra note 10, at 305.
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Banks were formerly unprotected when they accepted fraudulent
POAs that appeared to have been properly executed.117 Some banks
used to deem a POA “revoked” if it had been executed a certain number
of years prior.118 Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, banks cannot
interpret vague provisions in favor of an agent.119 Some scholars believe
that where a statute has a reasonableness standard, a financial
institution is already entitled to reject a POA and damages for
reasonable non-acceptance should be limited to the minor costs
associated with obtaining an unquestionably valid POA.120
The 2006 UPOAA explicitly protects a third party who in good faith
believes that a POA is suspect.121 Under the UPOAA, a third party may
request certification of any factual matter concerning a principal, agent,
or power of attorney, as well as the opinion of legal counsel regarding a
POA.122 Based on the available evidence, a third party would be
empowered to reasonably refuse to accept a POA. If a refusal is
unreasonable, the penalty is limited to the attorneys’ fees necessary to
rectify the situation.123
While Alaska’s current POA statute arguably allows a third party
financial institution to refuse to accept a POA if there is a valid basis to
do so,124 the notice on the statutory form regarding liability for refusal
likely outweighs a third party’s good faith desire to prevent a fraudulent
transaction from occurring.125 Incorporating an explicit statement
protecting a third party who reasonably refuses to accept a POA would
send a more direct message. This protection should be balanced by
117. Wentworth, supra note 40, at 39 (citing In re Estate of Davis, 632 N.E.2d
64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)).
118. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 38 (1958)).
119. Id. (citing Grabowski v. Bank of Boston, 997 F. Supp. 111, 117 (D. Mass.
1997)).
120. Id.
[A] financial institution that rejects a document based on reasonable
acceptance and review guidelines should be protected from liability. In
addition, the damages that would result from liability for nonacceptance would generally be different from those stemming from
exposure for permitting an unauthorized person to access the account.
For example, damages for an unreasonable failure to accept a power of
attorney might equal the costs associated with the court appointment of
a guardian in lieu of reliance on the power of attorney.
Id. at 42.
121. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 119 (2006); see also STIEGEL & KLEM, supra
note 16, at 12.
122. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 119(d) (2006).
123. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 120; see also Whitton, supra note 2, at 45.
124. Section 13.26.353(c) of the Alaska Statutes only imposes a civil penalty
where the POA presented to the non-accepting third party is “valid.”
125. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (2008).
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inclusion of a penalty for instances where the refusal is clearly
unreasonable. Taking a cue from the 2006 UPOAA, the Alaska statute
could explicitly lay out circumstances under which a third party is
authorized to refuse to comply with an agent’s request.126 This
ultimately would have the effect of both protecting third parties and
encouraging them to act according to their reasonable suspicions that a
purported agent is acting unlawfully.127
This provision could be criticized as being unduly burdensome to
the principal, especially in cases where refusal is based on a reasonable
but false assumption.128 In some instances, banks have required
principals to complete a POA form issued by the institution itself.129
Existing surveys of estate lawyers indicate that this extra measure of
protection is not unduly burdensome.130 Others have suggested that
guidelines be established under which third parties are required to
review POA documents.131
The most important attribute of the UPOAA provision is that it
creates a safe harbor for third parties, allowing them to prevent
fraudulent transactions from occurring without requiring them to
conduct full investigations.132 If a refusal is unreasonable, a third party is
required to rectify the situation but is not excessively punished for that
error.133 This creates an environment in which a third party may act
without fear when he suspects the presence of financial exploitation.
Other jurisdictions have taken the duty of the third party to a
higher level.134 Some scholars have suggested that certain financial
institutions be made mandatory reporters.135 Some states have even
126. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 120(b)–(d).
127. See Whitton, supra note 44, at 352; see also STIEGEL & KLEM, supra note 16,
at 12.
128. Cf. Whitton, supra note 44, at 352 (noting how practitioners complain of
“arbitrary” refusal of POA documents by financial institutions).
129. Wentworth, supra note 40, at 42. This requirement, for obvious reasons,
can only lawfully be complied with where the principal is not incompetent.
130. Whitton, supra note 2, at 39 (“Despite the significant percentages of
attorneys who reported difficulty with acceptance of POAs by banks, brokerage
houses, and insurance companies, case decisions on this issue are scant.
Practitioners report that if the principal is still competent, it is faster and less
costly to have the principal execute the form favored by the third party.”).
131. Wentworth, supra note 40, at 42.
132. See Whitton, supra note 2, at 45.
133. See id. (“[A] safe harbor permitting refusals of a valid power of attorney
when the third person suspects that something is amiss allows the third person
to ‘do the right thing’ without imposing an unreasonable burden to ‘watch dog’
all agent-conducted transactions.”).
134. See Whitton, supra note 2, at 46 (noting that it may be necessary to subject
third parties to consequences in order to prevent harmful delays in the agent’s
ability to use a POA).
135. Federman & Reed, supra note 10, at 88.
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required that third parties notify principals when a transaction exceeds a
certain amount.136 However, the effect of mandatory reporter statutes is
unclear.137
There have also been suggestions that certain third parties be given
the power to revoke a POA if a principal becomes incapacitated.138 This
would necessarily require an extremely high level of proactive
involvement on the part of the third party, and would likely deter
institutional third parties, such as banks, from getting involved in any
capacity.
Additionally, scholars have suggested that only original versions of
a POA should be accepted, thereby reducing the opportunity to fabricate
a POA using validly obtained signatures from other documents.139 In
addition to requiring that a POA be recorded, it has also been suggested
that states should create a public registry listing individuals who have
been convicted of durable POA abuse.140 While this may be a resourceintensive objective, the idea of creating knowledge references and
databases for third parties is a sensible one.141
3. Healthcare Professionals
Another preventative measure requiring substantial third party
involvement would be to require a mental health assessment by a
licensed professional, in which the professional certifies that a principal
is competent to appoint a power of attorney. Though not widely
recommended by the UPOAA or by experts in the field, Alaska already
has a statute laying out the procedure to establish a principal’s
disability.142 The procedure established in this provision would be
relevant if a POA in question is non-durable, and one party—either an
agent or a third party—has argued that a POA has expired because of
the principal’s disability.
Alaska could require a mental assessment before a durable POA is
signed, to assure that an elder is competent at the time an agent is
appointed. The additional expense to the state is unknown at the current
time. However, it is noteworthy that existing infrastructure enabling

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 72.
Dessin, supra note 10, at 304.
Felderman & Reed, supra note 10, at 45, 66–67.
Wentworth, supra note 40, at 41.
Federman & Reed, supra note 10, at 77.
Id.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.353(a)(1)–(2) (2008).

VUDINH_FINAL.DOC

20

5/7/2010 5:36:08 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 27:1

health assessments throughout the state is already funded through a
composite of federal, state, and private sources.143
D.

Reforms That Create Remedies for a Defrauded Victim

This section complements the reforms discussed above that place
an agent on notice of the repercussions of POA abuse.144 While it is
arguable as to whether criminal or civil sanctions effectively deter an
unlawful power of attorney, this section focuses on helping a principal
obtain remedies through litigation.
The UPOAA makes it clear that the State retains the ability to
impose civil and criminal sanctions against perpetrators of POA
abuse.145 While defrauded elders may be unable to seek redress through
personal injury litigation because of the loss of assets, statutes imposing
criminal and civil prosecution would enable district attorneys and civil
prosecutors to pursue relief through explicit, easily applied laws.
Civil and criminal sanctions have been created by statute all over
the country,146 including in Oklahoma,147 Florida,148 New Hampshire,149
Maine,150 and Arizona.151 In New Hampshire, for example, the
legislature created a rebuttable presumption that a transfer made by an
agent for inadequate consideration, without explicit authorization in a
durable POA, indicates undue influence, fraud, or misrepresentation.152
In Maine, a gift of over ten percent of total assets creates a presumption
of undue influence.153 Arizona enacted a “slayer statute,” precluding
perpetrators of elder fraud from inheriting the estates of those they
defrauded.154

143. See Regan Foster, Telemedicine Reaches Over 200 Alaska Locations, ALASKA
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Jan. 27, 2003, available at http://www.alaskajournal.
com/stories/012703/foc_20030127016.shtml.
144. See supra Part III.B.
145. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 123 (2006); see also STIEGEL & KLEM, supra
note 16, at 12.
146. See Whitton, supra note 2, at 23.
147. Federman & Reed, supra note 10, at 74–75.
148. Id. at 75.
149. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506:6(VII)(a) (2005).
150. See Dessin, supra note 10, at 315.
151. Boxx, supra note 11, at 13–14. In the 1990s, elder abuse was gaining public
attention, and Arizona, a state with a high population of retirees, was on the
forefront of statutory reform and prevention. Because of the serious penalties
associated with POA abuse in that state, revocable trusts have become a more
frequently used planning tool for aging Arizonans. Id.
152. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506:6(V) (2005).
153. Dessin, supra note 10, at 315.
154. Boxx, supra note 11, at 14.

VUDINH_FINAL.DOC

2010

5/7/2010 5:36:08 PM

POWER OF ATTORNEY

21

At least one observer has recommended that there be specific laws
stating that an agent who commits fraud must indemnify a defrauded
principal.155 The remedy created by such a provision, however, is
arguably duplicative of the common law and statutory remedies
allowed for fraud, undue influence, and other tort claims.
One issue given little treatment in contemporary studies is the
problem of proof. While causes of action may have been created to
enable victims to obtain relief, the absence of proof may effectively
prevent a civil or criminal case from beginning. A relevant statutory
provision might require that third parties who accept a POA document
keep a photocopy of the document presented to them. Also helpful
would be a requirement that agents keep all receipts and records of
expenses paid on a principal’s behalf with the principal’s assets.

IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE AVAILABLE REFORM
PROVISIONS
A.

Virtues of the Power of Attorney

It is clear that a safe POA is not necessarily the most useful POA.
Part of what makes a POA beneficial is the low cost and relatively small
burden on all parties involved: legal counsel is not required, statutory
forms are widely available, and monitoring by the State is minimal.
These characteristics, however, are precisely what make a POA so easy
to use for fraudulent purposes.
Alaska has a population of approximately 686,000 residents,156
dispersed over 586,000 square miles.157 There are approximately 4000
licensed attorneys in the state.158 In Alaska, usable and flexible POAs are
necessities, particularly in bush areas where there are no attorneys and
very limited court resources available to serve as POA monitors.159
As with all legislation, cost will be a major factor in determining
which provisions the Alaska legislature should adopt. By looking at
some factors that play an important role in the issue of POA abuse and
155. Wentworth, supra note 40, at 42.
156. U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Annual Estimates of the Resident
Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000
to July 1, 2008, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est2008.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
157. David B. Allen, A Land of Superlatives, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL.,
Mar./Apr. 1999, at 5, available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/bulletin/
99/03-04/4-5.pdf.
158. Alaska Bar Ass’n, http://www.alaskabar.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
159. At the trial court level, there are forty superior court judgeships and
twenty-one district court judgeships. See About the Alaska Court System,
http://www.courts.alaska.gov/ctinfo.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
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elder fraud in Alaska, the legislature can identify and tailor reforms to
the needs of Alaskan elders. Legislators can consider the fact that the
provisions will likely affect the agents who have been functioning
properly without the reforms. This Part will evaluate broad themes that
should be considered and is not intended to be a detailed analysis of
each of the reform provisions enumerated above.160
B.

Burdens Accompanying the Available Reform Options

1. Burden on the State to Monitor
In Alaska, some level of outside monitoring exists in most types of
fiduciary relationships. Consider a guardian, who holds the same power
as a durable POA but must be reviewed by a court visitor and the court
itself upon appointment.161 Along with the initial court procedures
required to establish the guardianship, a guardian must submit annual
reports to a court.162 Consider also a trustee, who must abide by a trust
document drafted by an attorney163 and who must file income reports to
various entities, including federal and state tax agencies.164 Lastly,
consider the example of an executor, whose nearly every move
regarding an estate must be reviewed and approved by a court.165
Creating these types of fiduciaries costs substantially more than
appointing a power of attorney.166 The fact that there is less monitoring
of a POA is what keeps it a low-cost alternative. However, where there
is less state monitoring, there is a greater need for specificity of the terms
present in a POA.167 Additionally, monitoring by third parties, who are
often in a position to prevent fraud from occurring, becomes more
important to a comprehensive scheme of fraud protection.
2. Burden on the Principal
The burden on a principal, or lack thereof, was the prevailing
priority in the development of power of attorney law up until 2006.
Critics have claimed that requiring periodic registration and accounting
of a principal’s estate, regardless of a principal’s incapacity, not only

160. See supra Part III.
161. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.106, 13.26.108, 13.26.145 (2008).
162. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.118(a) (2008).
163. Whitton, supra note 2, at 10.
164. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6012(a)(4) (2006) (describing when trusts must file
income tax returns).
165. Boxx, supra note 11, at 44.
166. It has been reported by some that a guardianship can cost upwards of
$10,000. See, e.g., id. at 5 n.24.
167. See id. at 44.

VUDINH_FINAL.DOC

2010

5/7/2010 5:36:08 PM

POWER OF ATTORNEY

23

burdens an agent but also burdens a principal who needs to be able to
benefit from a flexible transfer of assets for her care.168
However, the provisions providing a principal with more explicit
information as to the impact of the powers bestowed upon an agent are
low-cost remedies which might achieve the goal of better educating
principals. Requiring legal counsel for a POA is often cost-prohibitive
and would seriously undercut the ease with which a POA can be
used.169 But straightforward information regarding the POA itself
combined with special treatment of hot powers could provide
meaningful education to an elder in need of a POA.
3. Burden on the Agent
Adding any provisions requiring additional accounting work on
the part of an agent clearly burdens an agent and disincentivizes an
individual from becoming an agent. An alternative requirement—
mandating only that receipts be kept and costs documented and limiting
accounting to occasions when it is demanded by a principal or any
government agency acting in an elder’s best interests—could be
implemented at a relatively small cost to an agent and could have
significant benefits for the protection of principals.
The truly prohibitive reform provisions are those that force an
agent to absorb costs even when fraud is not present, such as requiring a
surety bond to be posted. Furthermore, such a requirement might be
counterproductive, as a principal may opt to pay for the surety bond so
that a particular individual may serve as an agent.
Restoring liability for agents in the manner of the 2006 UPOAA, or
even the Uniform Probate Code of 1969, should also be considered. The
burden created by such reforms would primarily impact only a
fraudulent agent.
4. Burden on Third Parties
Ultimately, as some observers have noted, neither a power of
attorney nor any other type of agency relationship will completely
prevent an elder’s assets from being fraudulently squandered.170
Accordingly, the importance of having third party financial institutions
involved in screening out fraudulent transactions is critical in
preventing elder fraud.
168. Whitton, supra note 2, at 16.
169. An example would be the agents that are appointed for the purpose of
using an elder’s social security funds to pay for various expenses. Often, such
elders have a very small fixed income, cannot afford to obtain legal counsel, and
have very few options available for free legal advice.
170. Whitton, supra note 2, at 49.
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Given that Alaska already has a number of resources that would
enable monitoring without significant additional expense, it is useful to
consider some of the recommendations that would increase the ability
for monitoring, whether by a state agency or by another third party. Of
the various recommendations requiring State involvement (having
documents recorded, requiring signing in front of a court, creating a
registry of POA offenders, etc.), it is important to note that Alaska
already has a website of recorded documents available statewide.171
Requiring that POAs be recorded would add very little expense to the
state operating budget, given that the infrastructure necessary to comply
with a recording provision already exists. In short, Alaska will need to
look at infrastructure already in place to see if any reform provisions
could take advantage of those resources at a relatively low cost.172
Similarly, requiring medical professionals to assess an elder’s
competence before that elder signs a POA would be effective in
reducing the use of undue influence on an incompetent elder. Using
health resources that already exist would create extra protection,
especially for vulnerable Alaskan elders in remote bush areas.173
Reform provisions must allow third parties to evaluate a POA
document and refuse to complete an individual transaction. Such
provisions could also create a standardized minimum required
evaluation procedure providing the third party with a litmus of how to
measure an agent’s transactions. It is optimal that third party financial
institutions holding a principal’s assets be required to verify the
authenticity of a POA, whether through recorded documents,
consultation with appropriate parties or attorneys, or other related
provisions.174
It is crucial for the legislature to create a safe haven for banking
institutions that seek to prevent fraud. Another more powerful step in
this direction would be to make those banks mandatory reporters,
without requiring full investigations.
171. Recorder’s Office, Alaska Dep’t of Natural Res., http://dnr.alaska.gov/
ssd/recoff/search.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
172. For instance, the Alaska Court System utilizes Courtview, a
comprehensive online docketing system that covers nearly all jurisdictions
across the state. Alaska Trial Court Cases, Courtview Search, http://www.court
records.alaska.gov/pa/pa.urd/pamw6500.display (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
This might be used instead of creating a separate central registry of POA
offenders.
173. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
174. See Wentworth, supra note 40, at 38 (“Verifying the authority of the
attorney-in-fact to act for the account owner . . . is the first priority of every
financial institution and an estate planning attorney must recognize (and, when
working with attorneys-in-fact, should set the expectation) that this initial
reaction is appropriate.”).
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CONCLUSION
The Alaska power of attorney statute can benefit greatly from the
reform recommendations made by the UPOAA, legislation passed or
proposed in other jurisdictions, and proposals by contemporary elder
law experts. Under the current statute, the amount of POA abuse is
already significant and is sure to increase as the resident population
continues to age. Available low-cost reforms exist that work well with
some components of Alaska’s existing infrastructure. Lawmakers should
consider enacting such reforms to curb this growing problem, which has
devastating effects on elders in Alaska.

